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ASYMPTOMATIC BIV AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Elizabeth C. Chambers
Abstract: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not state whether it prohibits
discrimination against individuals who are infected with HIV but asymptomatic. Some courts
have held that the language of the ADA is unambiguous and does not cover asymptomatic
HIV as a disability because the virus is not an "impairment" that substantially limits a "major
life activity." Other courts have looked behind the statutory language and found that Congress
intended to protect asymptomatic individuals with HIV because the virus impairs one's ability
to procreate and/or engage in sexual relations. This Comment argues that asymptomatic
individuals with HIV are indeed protected under the ADA, but that the analytic framework
thus far employed by the courts is flawed. Asymptomatic HIV is a protected disability not
because it is independently debilitating, but because the prejudices and fears of others may
prevent HIV-infected persons from fully participating in society. The ADA was enacted to
prevent exactly this type of discrimination.
Approximately 612,000 Americans suffer from acquired immuno-
deficiency syndrome (AIDS).' Hundreds of thousands more unreported
adults and children are infected with the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), which causes AIDS.2 Many individuals who test positive for HIV
do not develop the infection's outward symptoms and degenerative
effects for a dozen years or more.? Asymptomatic HIV-infected persons
may nonetheless endure a different debilitating side effect from their
infection-discrimination. The prejudices, fears, and legacy of
discrimination against HIV-infected individuals have strong roots in
American society.4 It is not clear, however, whether and to what extent
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
9 HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, at 3 (Midyear ed. 1997).
2. Id. (noting that as of June 1997, approximately 87,000 persons were infected with HIV, but not
AIDS, in 29 states that conducted HIV case surveillance of adults, adolescents, and/or children,
excluding persons who tested anonymously). As many as one million Americans may be infected
with HIV. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (Ist Cir.)
(No. 97-156), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
3. Christine Gorman, Battling the AIDS Virus: There's Still No Cure, But Scientists and Survivors
Make Striking Progress, Time, Feb. 12, 1996, at 62, 64; see also Robert Steinbrook, Battling HIVon
Many Fronts, 337 New Eng. L Med. 779, 779 (1997) ("Of the estimated 650,000 to 900,000 HIV-
infected people in the United States, many do not know that they are infected.") (citation omitted).
4. Steinbrook, supra note 3, at 780. According to a recent survey of 2000 adults, more than one in
five Americans favor firing or restricting an HIV or AIDS-infected colleague, and more than 30% of
workers believe their employers would fire, or place on disability, an infected colleague. Charlene
Washington Law Review Vol. 73:403, 1998
the predominant disability law, the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA),5 protects asymptomatic HIV-infected persons from employment
and public accommodation discrimination.6 Resolving this issue is
immensely important to those who struggle to lead normal lives in the
face of knowing they are infected with a fatal, incurable disease.
Likewise, employers and owners of public accommodations need to
know their legal obligations to such individuals.
Congress adopted the ADA to protect disabled individuals who are
subjected to discriminatory treatment because of stereotypical
assumptions that do not reflect their ability to participate in, and
contribute to, society.7 The statute is silent, however, as to whether
asymptomatic HIV infection qualifies as a disability. The statute defines
the term disability in three ways: an actual disability, a record of an
impairment, or being regarded as having an impairment.8 Although the
statute fails to define these terms, the legislative history and
implementing regulations indicate that asymptomatic persons who are
infected with HIV may be considered disabled under either the "actual
disability" or "regarded as" prongs of the disability definition.9
Laino, AIDS a Big Concern in the Workplace (visited Feb. 28, 1998) <http://www.msnbc.comi
news/120025.asp>.
5. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
6. Compare Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 167-74 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff is not disabled within meaning of ADA), and Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding asymptomatic
mIV-positive person does not suffer limitation in major life activity and is therefore not disabled),
with Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (Ist Cir.) (concluding that plaintiff is disabled because
asymptomatic HIV affects major life activity of reproduction), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997),
and Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding asymptomatic HIV-positive
person disabled for purposes of Rehabilitation Act or ADA because HIV is contagious disease).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). This Comment will explore the disability definition's first prong
(a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual) and third prong (being regarded as having such an impairment). Whether an
individual has a "record of such an impairment," the second prong of the definition, is not as critical
to this Comment because none of the fact scenarios examined by the courts present individuals with
a record of HIV. Moreover, if an individual were discriminated against because of a record of having
HV, the most likely reason would be because of a fear or prejudice of the disease, therefore placing
the individual in the "regarded as" portion of the definition. See discussion infra Part Ill.B.
9. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C.
Asymptomatic HIV as an ADA Disability
Early Rehabilitation Act cases presumed that HIV infection qualified
as a disability,'0 and the U.S. Supreme Court has implied so as well." In
the absence of conspicuous statutory guidance, however, the circuits are
divided as to whether an individual who suffers from HIV, but who
remains asymptomatic, is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 2
Focusing on the "actual disability" prong of the disability definition,
some courts have held that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are
not disabled because the virus is not an "impairment" that substantially
limits a "major life activity."' 3 Other courts have found that Congress
intended to protect such people because HIV infection impairs the major
life activity of procreation and/or sexual relations. 4 The U.S. Supreme
Court recently granted a writ of certiorari to resolve this split in the
circuits and to specifically answer the questions of whether, under the
ADA, (1) reproduction is a major life activity, and (2) asymptomatic
individuals with HIV are per se disabled."
This Comment argues that the Court should resolve the debate among
the circuits by holding that asymptomatic HIV-positive persons are
protected by the ADA, but not on the grounds employed by the district
and circuit courts thus far. The "actual disability" prong of the disability
definition is an awkward fit as applied to asymptomatic HIV-positive
individuals. If disability status is restrictively linked to the ability to
procreate or have sexual relations, entire categories of persons are left
10. See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New
Social Construction of HIV, 23 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 16-17 (1997) (listing major federal and state
cases that concluded HIV-positive individuals are handicapped for purposes of Rehabilitation Act).
The ADA specifically acknowledges that cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are appropriate
precedent for ADA cases because the two statutes have identical disability definitions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(a) (1994).
11. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 n.7, 283 (1987) (declining to
answer whether AIDS infection qualifies as disability, but stating that individuals qualify as
handicapped under Rehabilitation Act if they are regarded as having impairment that substantially
limits their ability to work).
12. See cases cited supra note 6.
13. See, e.g.,'Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 169-72 (4th Cir. 1997);
Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
14. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554
(1997).
15. Abbott v. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997). In addition, the Court will decide a third issue of
whether a private health care provider under Title III must perform invasive procedures on an
infectious patient in the provider's office, and whether courts should defer to the health care
provider's professional judgment assuming it is reasonable in light of then-current medical
knowledge. Id. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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unprotected. Instead, to ensure that the ADA's basic goal of preventing
discrimination is met, all asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals should
qualify as disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's
disability definition whenever they are subjected to purposeful unequal
treatment because of their HIV-positive status.1
6
Part I of this Comment describes the relevant statutory and regulatory
provisions of the ADA. Part II discusses cases that examine whether
asymptomatic HIV qualifies as a disability. Finally, Part III argues that
applying the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability definition is
necessary to protect individuals with asymptomatic HIV infection from
discrimination.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Statutory Framework
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act 7 in 1973, a decade before
America had any awareness that AIDS would take the lives of hundreds
of thousands of Americans.' The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discri-
mination against "handicapped" individuals 9 participating in federally
funded programs.20 The Act defines a handicapped person as one who:
"(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."'" This
16. A peculiarity of the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition is that an asymptomatic
HIV-positive individual will not qualify as disabled until that individual is discriminated against.
This circularity is not specific to HIV-status, but is an idiosyncrasy of the statute's structure. See
infra Part 1I.B (discussing "regarded as" prong generally).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
(1994)).
18. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 1, at tbls. 16-18.
19. The Rehabilitation Act uses the term "handicap," 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B), whereas the ADA
refers to "disability," 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). Although these terms are legal equivalents,
the ADA uses the word "disability" rather than "handicap" because it is the term that persons
with disabilities currently prefer. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50-51 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-33; M.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26-27 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 448-50. In deference to modem preferences, the term "disabled" is used in this
Comment.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 701.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
406
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definition is nearly identical to that used by the Rehabilitation Act's
successor, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).22
When Congress passed the ADA in 1990, it expanded protection for
disabled individuals to cover employment, public services, trans-
portation, public accommodations, and teleconunuications. 2 Like the
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA seeks to protect individuals faced with
purposeful unequal treatment based on disabilities that are beyond their
control and not indicative of their ability to participate in, and contribute
to, society.' Although the statute itself does not provide any explicit
guidance as to whether an asymptomatic HIV-infected person falls within
its scope,' the legislative history, regulations and interpretive guidance
indicate that the statute was intended to cover such individuals.26
The ADA defines disability with respect to an individual as: "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."'27 Any
of these three subsets of the disability definition triggers the statute's
protections. Because the ADA adopted the Rehabilitation Act's disability
22. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994)). For a comparison of disability definitions, see 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A)-(C).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
25. Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1994). But see Runnebaum
v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that HIV is not
mentioned in statute itself, but finding that plain statutory language requires that asymptomatic HIV
infection is not impairment under ADA).
26. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). Although this Comment examines only the ADA's disability
definition, an individual must satisfy other requirements as well to qualify for the ADA's protection.
Individuals who can perform the essential functions of a job, with or without reasonable
accommodation, are considered qualified. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Under Title I of the ADA,
employers must provide reasonable accommodation to disabled individuals who are otherwise
qualified for the job, unless the accommodation would pose an undue hardship for the employer.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Under Title II of the Act, which prohibits discrimination in public
transportation provided by public entities, no qualified individual with a disability may be
discriminated against by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under Title II, disabled individuals
may not be discriminated against in any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases, or operates the public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. However, the ADA is not
applicable to any public accommodation where the disabled individual in question poses a "direct
threat," or significant risk, to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
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definition, the ADA specifically acknowledges that case law and
standards developed under the Rehabilitation Act are appropriate for
interpreting the ADA.28
B. Legislative History
The ADA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
include all HIV-infected individuals within the statute's purview. The
House Report on the ADA recognizes that it is impossible to list all of
the conditions, diseases, or infections that qualify as impairments, but
notes that "a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is
covered under the first [actual disability] prong of the definition of the
term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to procreation and
intimate sexual relationships."29 The Senate Report accompanying the
legislation contains similar language." Moreover, during floor debates
surrounding the passage of the legislation, a number of legislators
explicitly stated that an asymptomatic HIV-positive person is protected
by the ADA.3'
C. Interpretive Regulations
1. EEOC Regulations
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is
responsible for enforcing Title I of the ADA,32 which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of disability.3 The EEOC has
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994); see also Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53
F.3d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1995).
29. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
30. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22(1990).
31. "People with HIV disease are individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum of
NIV infection-asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic HIV infection or full-blown AIDS.
These individuals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the ADA ...."
136 Cong. Rec. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); see also 136 Cong. Rec.
H4626 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (noting that individuals who fall
anywhere along HIV's broad continuum of stages are covered under first prong of ADA's definition
of disability); 136 Cong. Rec. 11,453 (May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott) (same); 135
Cong. Rec. 19,867 (Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (concluding that individual is
protected by legislation if that individual is asymptomatie and HIV positive).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
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issued detailed regulations and interpretive guidance implementing the
ADA's disability definition.34
Under the "actual disability" prong of the disability definition, an
individual is considered disabled if that individual has "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual." '35 The EEOC regulations provide
extensive guidance to help interpret these terms. A "physical
impairment" is "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine."36
Although the EEOC regulations do not mention whether HIV is a
disability, the interpretive guidance provided in the appendix to the
regulations specifically states that impairments such as HIV infection are
inherently substantially limiting.37 This language draws no distinction
between asymptomatic and symptomatic HIV.38 A "major life activity" is
one that an average person can perform with little or no difficulty, such
as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."'39 This list,
however, is intended to be illustrative rather than exclusive.40
The "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability definition provides
that an individual qualifies as having a disability when that individual is
"regarded as having such an impairment."' The EEOC regulations
provide that an individual is disabled under this prong if: (1) the
impairment itself does not substantially limit a major life activity but is
treated by an employer as having such a limitation; (2) the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity only as a result of others'
attitudes towards the impairment; or (3) the individual does not have a
substantially limiting impairment but is treated by an employer as such.42
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-.16 (1997).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
37. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
38. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
40. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
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The appendix to the regulations notes that an individual satisfies the third
part of the "regarded as" definition of disability if, for example, that
individual is discharged from his or her job in response to an untrue
rumor that he or she is HIV-positive.43
2. Department ofJustice Regulations
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is responsible for enforcing Titles II
and III of the ADA,' which prohibit discrimination in public services,
programs, and accommodations.45 Although the majority of cases
addressing asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals involves Title I of the
ADA,46 an overview of the DOJ's approach to the problem is useful
because all three titles rely on the same disability definition.4' The DOJ
regulations for Titles II and III clearly state that HIV qualifies as an ADA
disability.4 The regulations explicitly and unequivocally list "HIV
disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)" as an impairment.49
II. CASES EXPLORING ASYMPTOMATIC HIV AS A DISABILITY
Courts have failed to resolve definitively whether asymptomatic HIV
infection is a disability under the ADA. Early cases under the
Rehabilitation Act simply assumed without analysis that all forms of
HIV or AIDS infection were disabilities," and the U.S. Supreme Court
has implied that persons with impairments such as asymptomatic HIV
are handicapped under the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation
Act's definition." More recently, however, a split in the circuits has
43. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(a), 12186(b) (1994).
45. Title II prohibits public entities from discriminating against qualified individuals with regard
to services, programs, or any other activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). Title lI prohibits owners,
lessors, or operators of public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of disability with
regard to the use of such accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997); Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995). But see Abbott v. Bragdon,
107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.) (examining whether asymptomatic HIV-infected patient qualifies as having
disability under Title H]), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
48. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(I)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(I)(iii) (1997).
49. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii).
50. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 10, at 16-17.
51. See infra Part I.B.
410
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emerged. A number of courts have concluded that asymptomatic HIV-
positive individuals are not disabled within the meaning of the ADA
because the virus is not an "impairment" that substantially limits a
"major life activity." 2 Other courts have held that asymptomatic HIV-
positive persons are protected by the ADA because the infection impairs
the major life activity of procreation and/or sexual relations.53 When it
decides the appeal of Abbott v. Bragdon, the U.S. Supreme Court has the
opportunity to settle some of this disagreement by answering the
questions of whether reproduction is a major life activity and whether
asymptomatic individuals with HIV are per se disabled.
A. Early Rehabilitation Act Cases
Until the passage of the ADA, every relevant judicial decision found
that both AIDS and asymptomatic or symptomatic HIV infection were
disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act or comparable state statutes.'
Many of these cases dealt with children infected with HIV who were
prohibited from attending schools because of others' fears of the
disease. 5 Rather than analyzing where individuals with AIDS or HIV fit
within the disability definition, many of these cases assumed without
discussion that these individuals were disabled under the Rehabilitation
Act without discussing the question.56 Early ADA cases also held,
without significant analysis, that asymptomatic HIV was a disability."
52. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 169-72 (4th Cir. 1997);
Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
53. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554
(1997).
54. Parmet & Jackson, supra note 10, at 16-17.
55. See, e.g., Ray v. School Dist. of Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1528-29 (M.D. Fla.
1987).
56. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 675 F. Supp. 1574, 1575, 1583
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (reviewing whether under Rehabilitation Act plaintiff infected with AIDS has right
to education in least restrictive environment without examining whether she was disabled under
Act); Ray, 666 F. Supp. at 1536 (concluding as matter of law under Rehabilitation Act that plaintiff
schoolchildren infected with HIV should be admitted to normal integrated classroom without
questioning whether plaintiffs were actually disabled under Act).
57. Parmet & Jackson, supra note 10, at 22.
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B. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 8 the U.S. Supreme Court
specifically declined to reach the question of whether a person with
AIDS or any other contagious disease has a physical impairment, or
whether such a person could be considered disabled solely on the basis of
contagiousness. 9 The Arline Court did state, however, that an individual
qualifies as disabled under the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation
Act's handicap definition if the individual is regarded as having an
impairment and is therefore substantially limited in his or her major life
activity."
Although the Court found that the plaintiff had a physical impairment
that substantially limited one of her major life activities, thus rendering
her disabled under the "actual disability" prong of the disability
definition, Justice Brennan spent a considerable portion of the majority
opinion discussing the "regarded as" language contained in the final
prong of the definition. 1 Relying on congressional intent in adding the
"regarded as" language to the definition, the Court stated that although
an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental
capabilities, the negative reactions of others to the impairment could
nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work.62 The Court
observed that, by adding the "regarded as" prong to the disability
definition, "Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths
and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."'6
Subsequent cases have relied on a DOJ interpretation of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Arline.' Following Arline, the DOJ's Office
of Legal Counsel drafted a memorandum on the application of the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability to asymptomatic HIV-
58. 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987) (examining whether elementary school teacher, who was fired after
her third relapse of tuberculosis within two years, was handicapped within meaning of Rehabilitation
Act).
59. Id. at 282 n.7.
60. Id. at 284.
61. Id. at281-85.
62. Id. at283.
63. Id. at 284.
64. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1997).
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positive individuals.65 The DOJ first analyzed whether an asymptomatic
HIV-infected individual is disabled under the "actual disability" prong of
the disability definition.' The memorandum concluded that such an
individual has a "physical impairment," relying on findings by the
Surgeon General that "from a purely scientific perspective, persons with
HIV infection are clearly impaired."'67
A harder hurdle for the DOJ was whether the impairment affected
"any major life activities."6 In an interesting interpretation that moved
away from anything explicitly stated in Arline, the DOJ suggested that
the infected individual's knowledge of the disease may directly affect the
"major life activity" of procreation and intimate personal relations, thus
qualifying such an individual as handicapped within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act.69 The DOJ recognized, however, that there is nothing
inherent in the infection that actually prevents procreation or intimate
sexual relations; rather, the asymptomatic individual's response to the
disease results in a change of behavior.7' In cases where the individual
has in fact changed his or her behavior, the DOJ opined, courts may
consider this a limitation of a major life activity.7'
C. Circuits Are Divided over Whether Asymptomatic HIVlnfection Is
a Disability Under the ADA
In the wake of Arline, courts were left with no definitive guidance as
to whether the ADA protects asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals,
and if so, on what grounds.72 Courts also began to question whether
65. Memorandum to Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., Counsel to the President, Justice Department
Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988), available in Westlaw, BNA-DLR Database, 195 DLR D-1, 1988 [hereinafter
Culvahouse Memorandum].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. This appears to constitute the first suggestion that procreation and sexual relations are
major life activities under disability laws as applied to asymptomatic HIV-positive persons. This
approach has been adopted by some courts to find asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
70. Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65.
71. Id.
72. Arline is not necessarily controlling because: (1) the Court specifically declined to answer
whether a contagious disease such as AIDS is a disability; and (2) the Court's discussion of the
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sexual relations and procreation constituted "major life activities" under
the ADA for those infected with HIV as well as for persons who are
infertile,73 as the DOJ suggested.74 A resulting split emerged among the
circuits as to whether an HIV-infected individual is per se disabled and
thus protected from discrimination under the ADA.75
1. First and Ninth Circuits Consider Asymptomatic HIV a Disability
In Gates v. Rowland, the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish between
persons with full-blown AIDS and asymptomatic persons infected with
HIV.76 The case was brought under the Rehabilitation Act by an HIV-
positive prison inmate who was denied food service jobs.77 Although this
was a Rehabilitation Act case, the court relied on the regulations
"regarded as" portion of the disability definition was technically dicta and therefore not binding on
lower courts. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281-82 n.7 (1987).
Therefore, while the lower courts sometimes acknowledge the discussion of this issue in Arline, they
do not necessarily follow the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning as applied to asymptomatic HIV-
infected plaintiffs. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 173 (4th Cir.
1997) (finding no genuine issue of material fact concerning perception of plaintiff's HIV infection,
but acknowledging Arline's conclusion that others' negative reactions could substantially limit
ability to work).
73. A number of courts have concluded that reproduction is a major life activity. See, e.g., Abbott,
107 F.3d at 939; Bielicki v. City of Chicago, No. 97 C 1471, 1997 WL 260595, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
May 8, 1997); Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 977 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1997);
Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75 (E.D. Tex. 1996);
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Erickson v. Board of
Governors of State Colleges, 911 F. Supp. 316,323 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C.,
862 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-20 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568
(D.D.C. 1992); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Doe v. Dolton Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Others courts have held that
reproduction does not constitute a major life activity. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr.,
95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541, 547 (E.D.N.C.
1996); Farmer v. National City Corp., No. C-2-94-966, 1996 WL 887478, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5,
1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d
1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
74. See supra text accompanying note 69.
75. Compare Abbott, 107 F.3d at 949 (holding that asymptomatic woman was disabled), Gates v.
Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994), Hernandez, 977 F. Supp. at 1163, United States v.
Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. La. 1995), Kohn Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321,
and Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994), with Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 169-70
(finding that asymptomatic individuals infected with HIV are not disabled under ADA), Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1995), and Cortes, 955
F. Supp. at 547.
76 Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446.
77. Id. at 1444-45.
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implementing the ADA, which include both asymptomatic and
symptomatic HIV, and found that any person infected with HIV should
be considered an individual with a disability." For purposes of either the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the court found no distinction between
those who have AIDS and those who remain asymptomatic with HIV;
rather, the possible transmission of the virus to others is the basis of the
individual's disability.79
Similarly, in Abbott v. Bragdon, the First Circuit found that the
asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff had a physical impairment that
substantially interfered with her major life activity of reproduction, and
therefore held that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.8"
The case involved an asymptomatic HIV-positive patient who sued her
dentist under Title III of the ADA because he refused to treat her in his
office.8'
The Abbott court found "unhesitatingly" that HIV-positive status,
including asymptomatic HIV, is a physical impairment under the ADA.82
However, the court had more trouble clearing the second hurdle: whether
HIV affects a major life activity. 3 The plaintiff argued, and the court
ultimately accepted, that her reproduction was a major life activity
affected by the impairment.' Relying on congressional intent, the Court
found that reproduction, and the bundle of activities it encompasses, is a
major life activity because of its importance to those who engage in it.85
Rejecting the argument that reproduction cannot be considered a major
life activity because it is a lifestyle choice, the court noted that most acts
78. Id. at 1446 (noting that because Rehabilitation Act and ADA have identical disability
definitions, ADA regulations are relevant for interpreting Rehabilitation Act); see 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.104(l)(ii) (1997); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
79. Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446. The court did not clarify which prong of the disability definition the
plaintiff is covered by, and therefore did not discuss what major life activity may be affected by
asymptomatic HIV, nor whether the plaintiff was regarded as impaired. The court did, however, note
that HIV, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, penetrates the chromosomes of human cells so that
they cannot combat infections. Md2 (citing Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 706 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
80. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 949.
81. Id. at 937.
82. Id at 939.
83. Id. at 939-42.
84. Id. at939, 941.
85. Id. at941.
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that human beings perform have elements of volition. 6 The court
emphasized the plaintiff's specific decision not to have children due to
her HIV status and concluded that because of this decision, the HIV
impairment substantially interferes with the major life activity of
procreation.1
7
The Abbott court left open, however, the question of how it would rule
in similar future cases. The court stated that it might reach a different
conclusion if presented with other facts and circumstances, such as
medical improvements in reducing the likelihood of transmitting HIV
through reproduction."8 The decision, the court warned, "eschews a
blanket rule and instead demands a case-by-case inquiry into a service
provider's responsibilities to treat HIV-positive patients.
89
2. The Fourth Circuit Does Not Consider Asymptomatic HIV Status
a Disability
In Ennis v. National Ass'n of Business and Educational Radio, Inc.,
the Fourth Circuit rejected asymptomatic HIV as an ADA disability.'
The case involved a woman who brought suit under the ADA alleging
she was fired because of her employer's fear that its health insurance fees
would go up when she adopted an asymptomatic HIV-positive child.9
Finding that the ADA contemplates a case-by-case determination of
whether a given impairment substantially limits a major life activity, or
whether an individual is perceived as having a substantially limiting
condition, the court warned that HIV-positive status may never be
classified as a per se disability under the ADA.92 The court then noted,
without significant discussion, that because the HIV-positive child was
86. Id at 940-41. The court did not address other problems with reproduction as a major life
activity, see infra Part Ill.A.2, but did note that "the question is very close" of whether reproduction
is a major life activity. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
87. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942.
88. Id. at 949.
89. Id.
90. Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 57. The plaintiff relied on § 12112(b)(4) of the ADA, which prohibits employers from
taking adverse employment actions "because of the known disability of an individual with whom the
qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994).
92. Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
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asymptomatic and therefore suffered from no conditions that affected his
day-to-day life, he did not suffer a limitation on any major life activity.93
In Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, a twelve-member panel
of the Fourth Circuit split seven to five and confirmed that an
asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning
of the ADA under any prong of the statute's disability definition.94 The
case involved an asymptomatic man infected with HIV who was fired
from his job at a bank.9" The first question addressed by the Runnebaum
majority was whether an individual with asymptomatic HIV has an
"impairment" that substantially limits a "major life activity" under the
"actual disability" prong of the disability definition.96 Because the word
"impairment" is not defined in the statute, the majority turned to the
dictionary definition of the word and concluded that asymptomatic HIV
infection is not an impairment because, without symptoms, there are no
diminishing effects on the individual.97 The majority refused to look
behind the statute's language or to consider the ADA's legislative
history, finding that the statutory meaning is "plain and unambiguous.""8
Moreover, the majority determined that even if asymptomatic HIV
infection were an impairment, it would not substantially limit a "major
life activity."'  The court rejected the argument that asymptomatic
HIV status substantially limits the "major life activities" of procreation
and intimate sexual relations, reasoning that nothing inherent in HIV
substantially limits such activities."° It is the impairment, the court
reasoned, not the individual's reaction to the impairment, that must be
considered.'' Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff in this case
93. Id. Note, however, that for the purposes of the case, the court assumed that the boy was
disabled because the record may not have been fully developed as to whether there were any
limitations of the boy's major life activities or perceptions of any such limitation. lit
94. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 163.
96. Id. at 167 (analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
97. Id. at 168-69 (citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 603 (1986) (defining
"impairment" as to "make worse by or as if by diminishing in some material respect")).
98. Id. at 168. The court also pointed out that the committee reports do not distinguish between
asymptomatic HIV infection and symptomatic conditions, and therefore the committee reports'
indication that HIV-infected individuals are covered by the ADA does not apply to asymptomatic
HIV-infected persons. Id. at 169.
99. Id. at 171-72.
100. Id at 172.
101. Id.
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did not show that he abstained from intimate sexual relations or decided
not to have children because of his infection.'0 2
The court then turned to the "regarded as" prong of the disability
definition and addressed whether the plaintiff was regarded as having
such an impairment."3 The majority reasoned that the "regarded as"
prong incorporates by reference the "actual disability" prong's
description of a qualifying impairment: one that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities.' It followed that the "regarded as"
prong protects only those individuals who are regarded as having an
impairment that itself substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities.' The court found that the plaintiff was not regarded as having
such a limiting impairment and therefore was not entitled to ADA
protection. 1°'
The Runnebaum dissent argued that the majority's opinion moved the
Fourth Circuit "even further from the mainstream of ADA interpretation
.... [and] completely away from the interpretation that Congress clearly
intended."'0 7 The dissent further stated that even under the ordinary
dictionary definition employed by the majority, the effects of HIV on the
victim would constitute an impairment because the virus impairs the
body as soon as it enters it, although it is not outwardly visible.' 8
Therefore, the majority's interpretation of "impairment" ignores the stark
realities of asymptomatic HIV." Moreover, the dissent found that the
legislative history and implementing regulations confirm that procreation
and intimate sexual relationships are major life activities that are
substantially limited by asymptomatic HIV infection."0 Alternatively,
the dissent argued that the plaintiff may be protected under the "regarded
as" prong of the disability definition."'
102. Id.
103. Id. (analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 174.
107. Id. at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting) (contesting majority's rejection of case-by-case contem-
plation of whether individual is disabled).
108. Id. at 180 (Michael, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 183 (Michael, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 184 (Michael, J., dissenting).
111. Id at 186, 188 (Michael, J., dissenting) (stressing fact that plaintiff presented evidence that
created issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was "regarded as" being disabled).
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The heart of the debate among the circuits has thus focused primarily
upon the "actual disability" prong of the ADA's disability definition.
Those courts that have found asymptomatic HIV infection to be a
protected disability have done so on the ground that HIV limits
procreation and/or sexual relations.' In contrast, those courts that have
reached the opposite result simply disagree, finding either that
asymptomatic HIV is not an impairment or that it does not substantially
limit a major life activity." 3 The "regarded as" prong of the ADA's
disability definition has yet to serve as a basis for protecting
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals from discrimination.
III. ASYMPTOMATIC HIV-POSITIVE INDIVIDUALS ARE
PROTECTED FROM DISCRIMINATION BY THE ADA
Individuals who have contracted HIV, but who do not yet suffer from
symptoms of the virus, can and should be protected from discrimination
by the ADA. The ADA's legislative history, its interpretive regulations
and guidance, and statements by the U.S. Supreme Court all indicate that
this is the appropriate result. The current debate among the circuits over
whether the reluctance to procreate induced by a person's HIV status
qualifies HIV as a disability under the ADA's "actual disability" prong
obfuscates the real issues. The Fourth Circuit's approach, which fails to
protect HIV-positive persons from discrimination because it reads the
ADA as unambiguously calling for that result, is unsatisfactory; it
disregards the ADA's intent to protect disabled individuals who are
discriminated against based on faulty assumptions that do not reflect the
individuals' actual abilities. The First Circuit's approach, which
concludes that HIV constitutes a disability because it may force some
into the decision not to procreate or have sex, is equally unsatisfactory.
This approach fails because it does not protect large pockets of those
with HIV who do not, or cannot, engage in these "major life activities"
(such as children, post-menopausal women, and celibate monks); it also
awkwardly and artificially stretches the definition of the phrase
"substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" to the limits
of credibility.
112. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934,942 (lst Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
113. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168, 172; Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc.,
53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Instead of employing the "actual disability" prong of the ADA, courts
should rely on the "regarded as" prong of the definition. For the most
part, asymptomatic HIV-positive persons lead normal and productive
lives until the infection develops further. Only if the biases,
misperceptions, and fears of others lead to discrimination do such
individuals suffer from a disability that the ADA was meant to, and
should, protect.
A. Reliance on the "Actual Disability" Prong of the ADA 's Disability
Definition Is Awkward and Problematic
Although asymptomatic HIV infection does constitute an
"impairment" under the ADA, it is arguable whether it significantly
affects a "major life activity." For many people with HIV, it does not.
Reliance on the "actual disability" prong of the ADA's disability
definition is thus inadequate to protect everyone with asymptomatic HIV
from discrimination.
1. Asymptomatic HIVIs an Impairment
To qualify as disabled under the first prong of the ADA's disability
definition, an individual must have an "impairment.""' 4 The ADA does
not define "physical or mental impairment,""' 5 but EEOC regulations
define the phrase as any physiological disorder affecting, among other
body systems, the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems." 6 DOJ
regulations also consider both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV
infection to be an impairment under the ADA.'17 Even when an HIV
victim remains asymptomatic, the virus infects the immune system
immediately, entering the hemic and lymphatic systems and reproducing
itself in the white blood cells known as CD4 cells." 8
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
116. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)(1) (1997); see also discussion supra Part I.C.I.
117. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(ii) (1997); see also discussion supra Part I.C.2.
118. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 180 (Michael, J., dissenting); see also Gorman, supra note 3, at 64;
Christine Gorman, The Exorcists: Applying a Potent Combination of New Treatments, Medical
Researchers Are Determined to Expel the Terrible Specter ofAIDS as an Invincible Disease, Time,
Fall 1996 (Special Edition), at 64, 65 ("The big fight occurs in the harder-to-study lymph nodes,
where day after day, year after year the body battles the virus to a standstill before finally exhausting
its immunological reserves.").
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Surgeon General C. Everett Koop examined the question of whether
asymptomatic HIV constitutes an impairment within the meaning of the
ADA and concluded that "from a purely scientific perspective, persons
with HIV infection are clearly impaired.... [T]hey may appear
outwardly healthy but are in fact seriously ill."' 9 Koop also explained
that HIV infection is the starting point for a single, progressive disease,
and that early stages of the disease involve impairments but no visible
signs of illness.' Therefore, even though the infected individual remains
asymptomatic, HIV progressively deteriorates the immune system until
the final stages of the disease."' HIV's immediate and virulent attack on
the lymphatic and hemic systems, even while outwardly asymptomatic,
qualifies the disease as an impairment.'
The Runnebaum majority's reliance on the dictionary definition of
"impairment" to conclude that asymptomatic HIV infection does not
meet the statutory definition" reveals an inattention to the relevant
regulations24 and interpretive guidance and a misunderstanding of the
effects of the infection." The Runnebaum majority relied on dictionary
definitions of impairment such as "to make worse by or as if by
diminishing in some material respect,"'26 and found that early
asymptomatic stages of HIV infection involved no such impairment. This
finding, however, unjustifiably ignores the diminished capability of the
body's immune system, 27 as the remarks from the EEOC,'28 the DOJ,'29
and Surgeon General Koop 3° make clear.
119. Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65 (citation omitted).
120. Id.; see also Gorman, supra note 3, at 63 ("[T]he body and the virus engage in mortal combat
from the beginning.").
121. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 180 (Michael, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 183 (Michael, J., dissenting).
123. IH. at 168; see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1997).
125. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
126. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168 (citing Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 603 (1986)).
127. Id. at 180 (Michael, J., dissenting).
128. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
129. 28 C.F.RI § 35.104(l)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.(1)(iii) (1997).
130. Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65.
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2. For Some Infected Persons, Asymptomatic HIVMay Not
Substantially Limit a Major Life Activity
For HIV to qualify as a disability under the "actual disability" prong
of the ADA's disability definition, not only must it be an impairment, but
it must also substantially limit a major life activity.' 3' The regulations do
not provide an exclusive list of major life activities, but give examples
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, breathing, learning, and working.'32
Asymptomatic HIV would not appear to limit a "major life activity"
because the disease at this early stage does not affect one's day-to-day
life activities. Indeed, by all outward appearances, asymptomatic HIV-
positive individuals are indistinguishable from those who are not
infected. The ability of infected individuals to work, care for themselves,
or perform manual tasks is not directly affected by the disease.
Nonetheless, proponents of including asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals within ADA's "actual disability" definition argue that
procreation and intimate sexual relations constitute major life activities
that are limited by HIV.'33
While the argument that procreation and intimate sexual relations
qualify as major life activities as contemplated by the ADA has some
judicial support,'34 it is ultimately an unsatisfactory fit for asymptomatic
HIV-positive individuals.'35 In cases where an individual is discriminated
against because of his or her HIV-positive status, focusing on
reproduction and sexual activity arbitrarily distinguishes between
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
133. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 170 (4th Cir. 1997)
(reviewing argument by amici that procreation and sexual relations are major life activities);
Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997). In addition,
early proponents for protecting asymptomatic HIV or AIDS-infected individuals under the
Rehabilitation Act argued that persons with AIDS are handicapped within the statutory definition
because the ability to fight infection and preserve health is logically a major life function that is
substantially limited. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with
AIDS, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 681, 691 (1985). Despite its intuitive logic, this approach has not been
seized upon by courts dealing with the issue, perhaps because neither health nor immunological
functions are listed in the relevant regulations as major life activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
134. See supra note 73.
135. See generally Rhonda K. Jenkins, Case Note, 20 S. Il. U. L.J. 637, 647-49 (1996) (arguing
that in applying procreation as major life activity, ambiguity between statutory standard and lay
perception is significant concern to HIV-infected individuals),
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individuals based on circumstances (the plaintiff's fertility and
reproductive intentions) that have nothing to do with the discrimination
at issue.'36 Therefore, when an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual is
discriminated against in blatant disregard of the ADA's underlying
policy against "purposeful unequal treatment... based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals,"'37 the fate of that
individual is restrictively tied to irrelevant questions about the
individual's sexual habits and plans to have children.' Under this line of
reasoning, women who have gone through menopause, young children,
infertile people, or individuals who simply do not desire to have children
would not be entitled to ADA protection. This arbitrary distinction
among those who suffer from discrimination based on the same
characteristics (HIV positive status) is irreconcilable with the ADA's
intent to halt discriminatory treatment against all disabled persons.'39
In Abbott v. Bragdon, the case the U.S. Supreme Court will
consider, 40 this asymmetry is particularly clear. In holding that the
plaintiff's HIV impairment substantially limited the major life activity of
procreation, the First Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff decided not to
have children because of the risk of transmitting the disease.'4 ' If faced
with different circumstances, the majority acknowledged that it might
have held that the plaintiff did not qualify, implying that a plaintiff who
was unable, or unwilling, to have children for reasons other than his or
her HIV status might not be protected. The Abbott court also found
that reproduction and the bundle of activities it encompasses are major
life activities because of their singular importance to those who engage
in them.'43 This haphazard distinction, however, fails to account for and
136. Parmet & Jackson, supra note 10, at 34-35.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
138. An oddity of the "actual disability" prong of the disability definition, as applied to
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals, is that discrimination against infected individuals is more
likely to be subjectively based on an irrational fear of the infection rather than on some irrelevant
perception that the infected individual cannot, for example, have children. This discordance suggests
that the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition may be a more appropriate approach for
covering asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals under the ADA. See discussion infra Part IlI.B.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
140. 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
141. Id. at 942.
142. ma at 941-42, 949.
143. Id. at941.
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protect asymptomatic HIV-infected children because sexual relationships
are inapplicable to a child's day-to-day existence.
Additional difficulties with the "actual disability" approach will
inevitably arise as treatments for HIV infection improve. To qualify as a
disability, an impairment must impose a "substantial limitation" on that
major life activity.'" Because infected individuals can significantly
decrease the risk of infecting others by using condoms, 41 there may not
be a substantial limitation on sexual relations. Moreover, as medical
advances reduce the risk of passing on the disease to one's child' or
control HIV replication-infected infants, 47 those persons discriminated
against on the basis of HIV may lose the ADA's protection because the
disease may no longer "substantially limit" procreation. 48 Thus, even if
sexual relations and procreation are major life activities under the ADA,
they might not be significantly impaired by HIV infection.
A final difficulty with the "actual disability" prong is that HIV-
positive status alone does not limit sexual relations or procreation.149
Rather, the normative judgment of the infected person substantially
limits sexual activity or procreation.50 As the Runnebaum majority
noted, despite the knowledge of infection, some HIV-infected individuals
may not change their sexual behavior.' For example, if a married
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); see also Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123
F.3d 156, 167 (4th Cir. 1997); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992); Forrisi v.
Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1986). Although the appendix to the regulations finds that
impairments such as IV infection are inherently substantially limiting, it does not distinguish
between asymptomatic and symptomatic HIV infection. 29 C.F.1. app. § 1630.2(j) (1997). It makes
sense that symptomatic IV infection poses a significant restriction on one's life activities. This
logic, however, loses its luster as applied to asymptomatic IV-infected individuals because the
infection at this stage does not yet place any outward constraints on major life activities, much less
significant limitations.
145. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC AIDS Information, Prevention of HIV
Infection (visited Feb. 7, 1998) <http://www.edc.gov/nchstp/hiv aids/hivinfo/vfax1260040.htm>.
146. See Catherine M. Wilfert, Beginning to Make Progress Against HIV, 335 New Eng. J. Med.
1678, 1678 (1996) (noting that research on mother-to-child transmission of iIV has advanced to
where prevention of larger percentage of neonatal infection is now realistic possibility).
147. Katherine Luzuriaga et al., Combination Treatment with Zidovudine, Didanosine, and
Nevirapine in Infants with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I Infection, 336 New Eng. J. Med.
1343 (1997).
148. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 949.
149. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
150. Id.; see also Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65. Note, however, that there may be a
25% risk of passing IV on to one's children without AZT therapy and an 8% risk with such
therapy. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942.
151. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
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couple were both HIV-positive but infertile, they would have no reason
to abstain from sexual relations with one another. A strict reading of the
statutory language under the first prong of the disability definition
provides that the impairment itself, not one's reaction to it, must
substantially limit a major life activity.'52 By this interpretation,
asymptomatic HIW infection cannot qualify for protection under the
"actual disability" prong of the ADA's definition.
B. Asymptomatic HIV-Infected Individuals Are Protected from
Discrimination Under the "'Regarded As" Prong of the ADA 's
Disability Definition
Legislative history, interpretive regulations and guidance, and the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline
all indicate that the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability
definition is the appropriate provision for protecting asymptomatic HW-
positive persons from unjustified discrimination. Applying the "regarded
as" prong is the only way to effectuate the ADA's intent to protect all
HIV-infected individuals from discrimination.
1. To Fulfill Congressional Intent to Protect All HIV-Infected
Individuals from Discrimination, the "'Regarded As" Prong
of the ADA s Disability Definition Must Apply
The ADA's legislative history shows that Congress intended to
include all HIV-infected individuals within the statute's purview.'53 The
House and Senate reports both unequivocally conclude that an HIV-
positive person is covered by the ADA. 54 Several legislators who spoke
on the floor also concluded that asymptomatic HIV would be protected
by the legislation.'55
While the will of Congress to cover all HIV-infected persons under the
ADA is clear, the notion that the "actual disability" prong is the
appropriate way to achieve this goal, also expressed in the committee
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
153. See discussion supra Part I.B.
154. H.R Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334;
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990).
155. See supra note 31.
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reports and legislators' commentaries,"' undermines the overriding
intent to cover all HIV-infected persons. By inappropriately forcing these
individuals to seek qualification as disabled only under the "actual
disability" prong because of the effect of the disease on reproduction and
sexual relations," 7 the ADA would effectively exclude numerous HIV-
positive persons who suffer from the same discriminatory treatment
based on their HIV status, but who do not plan to have children or do not
have intimate sexual relations."8 Thus, requiring that HIV-positive
individuals' disability status be determined by the "actual disability"
definition because of the virus's effect on procreation and sexual
relations significantly diminishes Congress's overarching objective of
protecting HIV-positive individuals from discrimination.
Another reason the "actual disability" prong may not appropriately
reflect legislative intent is that those legislators who expressed their
opinion that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals would be covered
under the "actual disability" prong of the disability definition failed to
mention what "major life activity" would be covered by the disease.5 9
Lawmakers' shared presumption that HIV-positive persons would be
covered under the "actual disability" prong is likely no more than a
vestigial anomaly that may be traced back to the DOJ's memorandum
interpreting the Arline decision.t6' At any rate, the decision does not
appear to be the product of reasoned policymaking, and rigid adherence
to the mechanisms envisioned by Congress should not be allowed to
interfere with its underlying goals.
Only by protecting asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals under the
"regarded as" prong of the disability definition will the judiciary
effectuate Congress's underlying public policy goal of protecting persons
from purposeful unequal treatment based on stereotypes and irrational
156. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334 (noting that
HIV-infected persons are covered under "actual disability" prong because of substantial limitation to
procreation and intimate sexual relationships); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22 (same); see also supra
note 3 1.
157. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; S. Rep. No.
101-116, at 22.
158. See discussion supra Part IH.A.2. This disjunction does not alter the operation of the statute,
because in theory an individual could still bring a claim under the "actual disability" prong of the
ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). This construction seems ineffective, however, because it is
not aligned with the most likely subjective reasons for a person to discriminate against an
asymptomatic HIV-positive individual. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
159. Seesupra note 31.
160. Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65.
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fears not truly indicative of the individual's capabilities.' 6' More
specifically, this approach will universally cover all HIV-infected
persons as Congress intended. 2 Such protection under the "regarded as"
prong will focus exclusively on those who need it-persons subject to
discrimination-and will not artificially distinguish between HIV-
positive individuals based on characteristics that are unrelated to the
discrimination in question.
2. Courts Should Defer to ADA Regulations That Cover HIV Under
the "'Regarded As " Prong of the Disability Definition
The conclusion that the "regarded as" prong should apply whenever
others misperceive an impairment, thus resulting in a limitation of a
major life activity, is bolstered by the ADA's regulations 63 and
interpretive guidance. For example, the Arline Court notes that Health
and Human Services regulations list a cosmetic disfigurement as an
example of a physical impairment covered by the Rehabilitation Act." 4
Such a cosmetic disfigurement qualifies as a disability because when an
individual is discriminated against because of the disfigurement, the
discrimination may limit the major life activity of working. 6 The EEOC
regulations also provide that an individual is disabled for the purposes of
the ADA if that individual has an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity only as a result of others' attitudes towards the
impairment." In fact, the appendix to the EEOC regulations notes that if
a person is discharged from a job in response to an untrue rumor that he
or she is HIV-positive, that person qualifies as disabled under the
"regarded as" prong of the disability definition. 67
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX7) (1994).
162. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (1997); see also Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 480 U.S.
273,283 nn.9-10 (1987) (discussing Rehabilitation Act regulations).
164. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 n.10.
165. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(l) ('[]f an employer discriminates against such an
individual because of the negative reactions of customers [to the cosmetic disfigurement], the
employer would be regarding the individual as disabled and acting on the basis of that perceived
disability.").
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(IX2).
167. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(/).
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3. The U.S. Supreme Court's Reasoning in Arline Applies
Applying the Court's reasoning in Arline to asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals requires that when others discriminate against an
individual because of his or her HIV-positive status, that individual
should be considered disabled under the ADA. In Arline, the Court
stressed that even when an impairment itself does not substantially limit
a major life activity, others' negative and prejudicial reactions to the
impairment could.'68 The Court recognized that by including the
"regarded as" prong in the disability definition, Congress intended to
fight the effects of erroneous but nevertheless prevalent perceptions
about disabled persons who may not actually be incapacitated. 16 9
Therefore, the definition encompasses those who are substantially
limited in a major life activity as a result of misperceptions. 70 This is
exactly the type of discrimination faced by asymptomatic HIV-positive
individuals.'1
7
This statutory construction adopted in Arline is particularly applicable
to situations where asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are
discriminated against on the basis of their disability despite the fact that
the impairment itself does not limit any major life activities. The
perceived impairment need not result directly in a limitation of a major
life activity, so long as the indirect effect of others' misperceptions is to
limit a life activity such as working.'72 Hence, "society's accumulated
myths and fears" can be as debilitating as an actual impairment that
limits a major life activity. 17 That is, HIV-infected individuals, even
those who remain asymptomatic, may be impaired in a major life activity
if they are discriminated against because of the disease.
4. Cases Finding the "'Regarded As " Prong of the Disability
Definition Inapplicable Were Wrongly Decided
In determining whether one falls under the "regarded as" prong of
the disability definition, a preliminary question is what "such an
168. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
169. Id. at 279 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,405-06 n.6 (1979)).
170. Id. at 284.
171. It has been suggested that Justice Brennan was thinking of HIV when he wrote this portion
of the opinion, despite his disclaimer to the contrary. Parmet & Jackson, supra note 10, at 15.
172. Culvahouse Memorandum, supra note 65.
173 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
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impairment" means. There is a tension as to whether "being regarded
as having such an impairment"' 74 contemplates (1) literally being
regarded as having an impairment that itself limits a major life activity,
or (2) having an impairment that when misperceived by others limits a
major life activity. Disagreement among the courts and the relevant
regulations as to how to interpret the "regarded as" prong as applied to
HIV-positive persons indicates that the statute is ambiguous."75 Because
of this ambiguity, it is appropriate to look to both the congressional
intent to cover all disabled individuals and the regulations' interpretive
guidelines.
The Runnebaum court adopts the first literal interpretation, arguing
that the "such an impairment" language incorporates by reference the
qualification that one be regarded as having an impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.'76 There are,
however, a number of problems with the Runnebaum interpretation of
the "regarded as" prong. The majority falsely concluded that the
"regarded as" prong unambiguously should be interpreted as including
the requirement that one be regarded as having an impairment that limits
a life activity.'77 In doing so, the court ignores congressional intent, as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, in including the "regarded as"
prong within the disability definition to protect those who have an
impairment that does not diminish any physical capabilities, but still may
substantially limit the ability to work as a result of others' negative
reactions.178 This interpretation is also supported by the regulations,
which note that an individual meets the ADA's disability definition if
that individual has an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity only as a result of others' attitudes towards the impairment.'79
The Runnebaum court's misreading of the statutory language renders
the "regarded as" prong nugatory as applied to asymptomatic HIV-
infected persons. If procreation were accepted as a major life activity,
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
175. Compare, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 172-74 (4th Cir.
1997) (finding that to qualify under "regarded as" prong, plaintiff must be regarded as having
impairment that substantially limits major life activity), with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (defining
"regarded as" prong in three ways, including impairment that limits major life activities only as
result of others' attitudes).
176. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
177. Id.
178. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282-83 (interpreting identical Rehabilitation Act language).
179. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(f)(2).
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applying this interpretation would force the absurd result that for an
asymptomatic HIV-positive person to be regarded as disabled, an
employer would have to fire that person because the employer
subjectively thought he or she was unable to have children. In fact, this is
unlikely ever to be an employer's motivation for firing an individual with
HIV. Rather, the decision is based most frequently on misinformation
about contagiousness 8 ' or perhaps economic concerns. 8' Protecting
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals from this type of discrimination
requires using a different reading of the "regarded as" prong.
Under a proper interpretation of the "regarded as" prong as applied to
this situation, one is "regarded as having such an impairment" if he or
she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such
impairment. Applying this reasoning to asymptomatic HIV-positive
individuals, employees who suffer from prejudicial treatment because of
their HIV-positive status (despite the fact that the disease itself does not
actually affect any major life activities) are disabled under the ADA
because they are affected in the major life activity of working as a result
of the negative reactions of others to their impairment.
5. Public Health Considerations
Public health considerations argue strongly in favor of applying the
"regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability definition.'82 Public health
experts have recognized that discrimination against individuals with HIV
that goes unpunished by the law will deter infected persons from being
tested for and counseled about the disease.' Protecting infected
individuals under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's disability
definition will encourage infected persons not to hide their infection from
co-workers or others. If infected individuals avoid testing or hide their
HIV-positive status because they are worried about discriminatory
treatment, the discrimination against those infected with the disease will
not only harm their individual interests, but also will threaten the health
of the population as a whole.'
180. See, e.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
181. See, e.g., Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
182. Parmet & Jackson, supra note 10, at 10-11, 42.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ADA seeks to protect disabled individuals who suffer from
discriminatory treatment despite the fact that such persons can, and do,
function as productive members of society. This set of legal rights and
protections should cover asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals who,
despite the fact the infection causes no outward symptoms, may suffer
from unequal treatment because of society's accumulated myths and
fears about the disease. Nonetheless courts have disagreed when
confronted with the question of whether asymptomatic HIV-positive
persons who are discriminated against should benefit from the ADA's
protections. The debate among the circuit courts has focused on whether
asymptomatic HIV qualifies as an actual disability, with some courts
concluding that these individuals simply are not disabled under the ADA,
and others finding that they are disabled only because the HIV
impairment significantly affects the "major life activity" of procreation
and sexual relations.
The circuit court debate misses the mark. Asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals are indeed protected by the ADA. Congressional intent,
interpretive regulations, and case law all indicate that this is the correct
result. However, the "actual disability" prong of the ADA's disability
definition may be inadequate to protect many HIV-positive individuals
from discrimination because it may arbitrarily exclude anyone who does
not plan to have sex or have children. Thus, to fulfill the ADA's
underlying goals, courts must apply the "regarded as" prong of the
disability definition as well. The ADA's protection should be triggered
not because asymptomatic HIV is independently debilitating, but because
the negative reactions of others may lead to discrimination. The U.S.
Supreme Court should take this opportunity to clarify that all
asymptomatic HIV-positive persons are covered under the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA's disability definition.
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